Recap quiz

Consider 2-player Zelo-Sum gave Colin  $\begin{array}{c} clin \\ \hline clin \\ clin \\ \hline clin \\ \hline clin \\ clin$ 

What is the expected payoff to Reservary/Colin if Reservary plays mixed strategy  $\Xi = (\pm 2, \pm 2)$ Colin plays  $\Xi = (\pm 2, \pm 2)$ 

What is the expected payoff to Rosemany if Reservany plays mixed strategy  $\underline{x} = (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{2}{4})$ Colin plays pure strategy  $c_3$ 

$$\frac{colin}{h t}$$

x


Find security level for Rosemond's mixed strategy.

C

 $\mathbf{r} = \left(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{2}{3}\right)$ 

Example

set  $\underline{x} = (\underline{z}, \underline{z}), \quad \underline{z} = (\underline{z}, \underline{z})$ Show  $(\underline{x}, \underline{z})$  is Nash equilibrium



**Example 11.1.** Give a linear program for finding the row player's optimal mixed strategy for the zero-sum game with the following payoff matrix: Colio